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CIVIL RIGHTS-ELECTIONS-FEDERAL INJUNCTION AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-In September 1958, in its first complaint under the Civil
Rights Act of 1957,1 the United States sought to enjoin certain election

116 Stat. 140 (1870), as supplemented by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 637,
42 U.S.C. (1958) §1971, which provides in part: "(a) All citizens of the United States who
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registrars and deputy registrars in Terrell County, Georgia from continuing
racially-discriminatory practices in their registration of voters.2 The defendants, claiming the 1957 statute to be unconstitutional, moved for dismissal. The district court granted defendants' motion,a rejecting government arguments that the subsection authorizing suit by the United States
was limited to cases, like the case before the Court, of discrimination by the
state. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. Because the
alleged racial discrimination by defendants occurred in the performance of
their official state functions, they are subject to congressional power under
the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court concluded that the defendants could
not attack the statute on the ground that as applied to others it might be
unconstitutional. United States v. Raines, 80 S.Ct. 519 (1960). In a second
case under the 1957 act, the United States sought to annul the cancellation of the voting registrations of practically all Negro voters in Washington
Parish, Louisiana, which had resulted from challenges4 made by members
of a White Citizens Council for such irregularities as the inaccurate computation of the registrant's age. In addition, an injunction was sought
against future discrimination not only by the defendant registrar, who gave
effect to the discriminatory challenges, but also by the White Citizens Council and its members. The district court, in granting the relief sought,5
found that all the defendants were engaged in supervising the state election process, and that therefore their discriminatory conduct constituted
are otherwise qualified by law to vote ... shall be entitled and allowed to vote ... without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom,
usage or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary
notwithstanding. . . . (c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice which would
deprive any other person of any right or privilege secured by subsection (a) or (b), the
Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States,
a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief, including an application
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order..••" For a
discussion of this statute, see note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 573 (1958).
2 The complaint charged discrimination "against five Negroes (including four teachers)
in rejecting their applications to register because of their alleged inability to read and
write correctly and intelligibly, and for delaying hearings on applications." The complaint
further stated that only 48 of 5,036 Negroes of voting age within the county were registered,
as compared with 2,679 of 3,233 Whites. 4 CIVIL LIBERTIES DocKET 27-28 (Nov. 1958).
3 United States v. Raines, (M.D. Ga. 1959) 172 F. Supp. 552.
4 La. Rev. Stat. (1952 Supp.) §18:245 provides that "upon a written affidavit signed
and sworn to in duplicate before and filed with the registrar or his deputy by any two
bona fide registered voters of the parish, to the effect that after reasonable investigation
and on information and belief certain persons are illegally registered, or have lost their
right to vote ... the registrar shall ... notify the registrants ... requiring them to appear
in person • . . within ten days . • . and prove their right to remain on the registration
rolls ..•." Failure to appear, or, if appearing, failure to establish one's right to vote, results
in the striking of one's name from the rolls.
5 On October 7, 1959 the district court denied motions to dismiss the complaint.
United States v. McElveen, (E.D. La. 1959) 177 F. Supp. 355. Findings of fact, conclusions
of law and the decree were entered on January 11, 1960, but are not officially reported.
For text of the January 11th entries, see appendix of the Brief for the United States (filed
January 29, 1960) in the Thomas case.
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state action. On appeal by Thomas, the defendant registrar, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction of the district court
as to him pending decision of his appeal. The United States then petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari, and applied for an order staying the order
of the court of appeals. Held, the district court's judgment affirmed, as to
defendant Thomas, in a per curiam opinion citing the Raines decision.
United States v. Thomas, 80 S.Ct. 398 (1960).
Although it seems that the rather technical argument employed by the
district court in the Raines case to invalidate the statute on which the
United States reliedo could be rebutted on the merits,7 in its decision the
Supreme Court instead followed an established policy of allowing litigants
to "challenge the constitutionality of a statute only in so far as it affects
them."s Racially-discriminatory conduct of a state election registrar qua
election registrar is clearly discrimination by a state within the prohibition
of the Fifteenth Amendment, and hence subject to congressionally-prescribed sanctions.9 The Thomas case stands for the further proposition
that such discrimination by a registrar occurs, even though he may not
himself entertain a discriminatory intent,10 when he permits others to
avail themselves of state machinery in order to fulfill a discriminatory
scheme. Indeed, were this not the rule, a state could avoid the impact of
the Fifteenth Amendment merely by recognizing an appropriate right in a
reasonably-defined class, which class could be expected to exercise that
right in a discriminatory manner. Here the Louisiana statuten which recognized the general right in registered voters to challenge the propriety of
voting registrations was perhaps designed to achieve such an avoidance.
6 The district court reasoned that "any person" capable of violating 42 U.S.C. §1971 (a)
could be reached under 42 U.S.C. §1971 (c), and concluded that while only a state might
violate the "entitled" language, a private individual could "disallow" another the physical
opportunity to vote within the meaning of subsection {a). For text of these subsections,
see note I supra.
7 In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in interpreting the word "deprive" in
§I of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was said at 17: "The wrongful act of an individual ...
is simply a private wrong .•. an invasion of the rights of the injured party. . • • An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote..•." (Emphasis added.) One could argue
that although individuals might invade the right to be "allowed to vote ..• without distinction of race" they could not deprive another of this right, only the latter giving rise to
a government cause of action under subsection {c).
s Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 at 104 (1947). See, generally, Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 at 345-348 (1936). The principal
case recognizes several exceptions to the general rule, particularly where "if the Court had
not passed on the statute's validity in toto it would have left standing a criminal statute
incapable of giving fair warning of its prohibitions," citing United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1875), on which the district court relied. Principal case at 524.
9 See, generally, "State Action: A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 1 RACE RELATIONS I.Aw REP. 613 (1956).
10 Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948) (affirmative equitable enforcement of a
racially-discriminatory real property agreement); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)
(damage award for breach of a racially-discriminatory real property agreement); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (administration of a raciallydiscriminatory trust).
11 Summarized at note 4 supra.
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That a purge of Negro registrants would be initiated by Caucasians might
have been anticipated, while it would be extremely doubtful that Negroes
fortunate enough to be enrolled would attempt to challenge the registrations of White citizens.12 More difficult questions concerning the definition
of state action are suggested, however, by the district court decision with
regard to registrar Thomas' co-defendants. The district court enjoined
the White Citizens Council and its members on the basis of a broad concept of state function,13 precedent for which it found by rather liberally
interpreting Terry v. Adams.14 Regardless of whether this action of the
district court in the Thomas case has a thoroughly sound legal foundation,1 5
it would seem, nevertheless, to be a practical necessity for entry of a meaningful decree, for if only the individual election registrar could be enjoined
the entire proceeding would lose significance upon that individual's retirement from office.
Prior to 1957, impingements upon the free exercise of the right here
involved, which was first recognized by Congress in the Enforcement Act
of 1870,16 were subject to private civil damage11 and to criminal sanctions.18 By affording only retrospective relief, and relying upon possibly
unsympathetic southern juries for vindication of the Negro's right to vote,
these remedies suffer from inadequacies which are avoided by the present
statute's authorization of injunction proceedings instituted on behalf of the
government. Inasmuch as the practical effect of this extension of the federal injunction into yet another area19 is to substitute contempt proceedings before a judge for a criminal trial before a jury, a serious question as
to the integrity of the constitutional right to trial by jury would appear to
be raised.20 This dilemma, which posed no problem for Justice Brewer in
12 The scope of the southern Negro's voting problem is suggested by Gomillion, "Civic
Democracy and the Problems of Registration and Voting of Negroes in the South," 18 LAw.
GUILD REv. 149 (1958), who concludes at 150 that if all other methods of preventing them
from voting fail, Caucasians "threaten the Negroes with loss of credit or jobs, or with
physical violence."
13 Conclusion of Law No. 2, entered January 11, 1960. For text see Brief for the United
States (filed January 29, 1960) in the Thomas case at Sa.
14 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
15 In holding the Jaybird Democratic Association subject to the Fifteenth Amendment,
Justice Black, joined in the opinion of the Court by Justices Burton and Douglas, emphasized that Jaybird elections effectively determined the result of general elections. Terry v.
Adams, id. at 462. Justice Frankfurter relied in part on participation by county officials in
Jaybird elections. Id. at 470. Justice Clark's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Jackson,
Reed and Vinson, comes closest to enunciating a "state function" theory when it observes
that the Jaybird Association "takes on those attributes of government which draw the
Constitution's safeguards into play." Id. at 477. This seems to be Justice Clark's conclusion
rather than major premise.
1616 Stat. 140 (1870), 42 U.S.C. (1958) §1971 (a). For text see note 1 supra.
1717 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1958) §1983.
1818 u.s.c. (1958) §242.
19 E.g., Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, §208, 61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C. (1958)
§178, applied in United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959)
(industry-wide strike affecting the national health and safety).
20 For the American Civil Liberties Union position, approving the 1957 injunction
provisions, see 154 Cxvn. LIBERTIES 1 (Sept. 1957).
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In re Debs,21 probably cannot be resolved, but only compromised, much in
the manner of the 1957 statute which allows a trial de novo before a jury
in cases of severe contempt punishment.22
Robert Jillson

21158 U.S. 564 (1895). Inquiring as to whether the only vindication of federal inter•
ests might be through jury trial, Justice Brewer pursued an argument reductio ad absurdum.
He observed that "if all the inhabitants of a State, or even a great body of them, should
combine to obstruct interstate commerce ... , prosecutions for such offences had in such
a community would be doomed in advance to failure." He concluded that "there is no
such impotency in the national government." Id. at 581-582.
22 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. (1958) §1971 (d). The right arises if a fine of over 300 dollars
or imprisonment in excess of 45 days is imposed.

